thelucky8

Cross posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18048115

The Chinese government maintained its systematic suppression of human rights across the country in 2024, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2025. Repression was especially severe in Tibetan areas and for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and the authorities further dismantled Hong Kong’s basic freedoms.

For the 546-page world report, in its 35th edition, Human Rights Watch reviewed human rights practices in more than 100 countries. In much of the world, Executive Director Tirana Hassan writes in her introductory essay, governments cracked down and wrongfully arrested and imprisoned political opponents, activists, and journalists. Armed groups and government forces unlawfully killed civilians, drove many from their homes, and blocked access to humanitarian aid. In many of the more than 70 national elections in 2024, authoritarian leaders gained ground with their discriminatory rhetoric and policies.

“From freedom of expression to religious freedoms, the Chinese government has kept a chokehold over the country throughout 2024,” said Maya Wang, associate China director at Human Rights Watch. “The Chinese government has further tightened abusive laws and imprisoned critics and rights defenders, while making it increasingly difficult to report on government abuses throughout the country.”

[...]

The Chinese government maintained its systematic suppression of human rights across the country in 2024, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2025. Repression was especially severe in Tibetan areas and for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and the authorities further dismantled Hong Kong’s basic freedoms.

For the 546-page world report, in its 35th edition, Human Rights Watch reviewed human rights practices in more than 100 countries. In much of the world, Executive Director Tirana Hassan writes in her introductory essay, governments cracked down and wrongfully arrested and imprisoned political opponents, activists, and journalists. Armed groups and government forces unlawfully killed civilians, drove many from their homes, and blocked access to humanitarian aid. In many of the more than 70 national elections in 2024, authoritarian leaders gained ground with their discriminatory rhetoric and policies.

“From freedom of expression to religious freedoms, the Chinese government has kept a chokehold over the country throughout 2024,” said Maya Wang, associate China director at Human Rights Watch. “The Chinese government has further tightened abusive laws and imprisoned critics and rights defenders, while making it increasingly difficult to report on government abuses throughout the country.”

[...]

Cross posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18047893

Austrian digital rights organization noyb led by Max Schrems has filed GDPR complaints against TikTok, AliExpress, SHEIN, Temu, WeChat and Xiaomi for unlawful data transfers to China. While four of them openly admit to sending Europeans’ personal data to China, the other two say that they transfer data to undisclosed “third countries”.

As none of the companies responded adequately to the complainants’ access requests, we have to assume that this includes China. But EU law is clear: data transfers outside the EU are only allowed if the destination country doesn’t undermine the protection of data. Given that China is an authoritarian surveillance state, companies can’t realistically shield EU users’ data from access by the Chinese government. After issues around US government access, the rise of Chinese apps opens a new front for EU data protection law.

Austrian digital rights organization noyb led by Max Schrems has filed GDPR complaints against TikTok, AliExpress, SHEIN, Temu, WeChat and Xiaomi for unlawful data transfers to China. While four of them openly admit to sending Europeans’ personal data to China, the other two say that they transfer data to undisclosed “third countries”.

As none of the companies responded adequately to the complainants’ access requests, we have to assume that this includes China. But EU law is clear: data transfers outside the EU are only allowed if the destination country doesn’t undermine the protection of data. Given that China is an authoritarian surveillance state, companies can’t realistically shield EU users’ data from access by the Chinese government. After issues around US government access, the rise of Chinese apps opens a new front for EU data protection law.

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18029420

Archived link

According to Sikyong Penpa Tsering, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, the sharp decline in Tibetan arrivals is attributed to increased Chinese control following the 2008 uprising. Tsering also pointed to demographic shifts in Tibet, noting that there are fewer children due to reduced family sizes.

Speaking to ANI, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Sikyong Penpa Tsering said, "Just like any other community, the Tibetan diaspora community is also facing a lot of social and demographic change. One reason is, of course, from 1959-60 people proceeded or followed His Holiness the Dalai Lama--about 80-85 thousand Tibetans who came to India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Then till about the early 80s, there was no movement from Tibet at all, and from the early 80s onwards, some Tibetans were coming out during Hua Guofeng's time, and then from the 90s and year 2000, there were quite many Tibetans coming out up to 2008. We used to receive any number between 2,500 to 3,500 Tibetans every year. Most of them were young children who were left behind to study in India, not knowing whether they would be able to meet their families again or not."

This drastic decline has resulted in the Tibetan Reception Centre in Khaniyara village near Dharamshala standing largely vacant.

[...]

"After the 2008 uprising in Tibet, there was more control inside Tibet, and there may be other reasons why those things are happening. After Xi Jinping came into power, the control over the whole of China, more particularly over the Tibetan people, has been very strong, and even small variables like tourist guides who have been bringing these people over the Himalayas by taking money--have also been removed from Lhasa, as a lot more pressure on the Nepalese government," said Tsering.

[...]

Tsering highlighted efforts in Western countries to create new compact communities. "The larger number of Tibetans are in North America, Europe, Australia--all these countries. So there have been some initiatives from some Tibetans, particularly in Manasota, where we are talking about at least 3,000 to 5,000 Tibetans. They are planning to acquire about 80 acres of land to accommodate about 300 families where the compact Tibetan communities [can thrive]. Another group is also planning to open a charter school for Tibetans. These are new ecosystems within the Tibetan community," he said.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18029420

Archived link

According to Sikyong Penpa Tsering, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, the sharp decline in Tibetan arrivals is attributed to increased Chinese control following the 2008 uprising. Tsering also pointed to demographic shifts in Tibet, noting that there are fewer children due to reduced family sizes.

Speaking to ANI, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Sikyong Penpa Tsering said, "Just like any other community, the Tibetan diaspora community is also facing a lot of social and demographic change. One reason is, of course, from 1959-60 people proceeded or followed His Holiness the Dalai Lama--about 80-85 thousand Tibetans who came to India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Then till about the early 80s, there was no movement from Tibet at all, and from the early 80s onwards, some Tibetans were coming out during Hua Guofeng's time, and then from the 90s and year 2000, there were quite many Tibetans coming out up to 2008. We used to receive any number between 2,500 to 3,500 Tibetans every year. Most of them were young children who were left behind to study in India, not knowing whether they would be able to meet their families again or not."

This drastic decline has resulted in the Tibetan Reception Centre in Khaniyara village near Dharamshala standing largely vacant.

[...]

"After the 2008 uprising in Tibet, there was more control inside Tibet, and there may be other reasons why those things are happening. After Xi Jinping came into power, the control over the whole of China, more particularly over the Tibetan people, has been very strong, and even small variables like tourist guides who have been bringing these people over the Himalayas by taking money--have also been removed from Lhasa, as a lot more pressure on the Nepalese government," said Tsering.

[...]

Tsering highlighted efforts in Western countries to create new compact communities. "The larger number of Tibetans are in North America, Europe, Australia--all these countries. So there have been some initiatives from some Tibetans, particularly in Manasota, where we are talking about at least 3,000 to 5,000 Tibetans. They are planning to acquire about 80 acres of land to accommodate about 300 families where the compact Tibetan communities [can thrive]. Another group is also planning to open a charter school for Tibetans. These are new ecosystems within the Tibetan community," he said.

[...]

Archived link

According to Sikyong Penpa Tsering, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, the sharp decline in Tibetan arrivals is attributed to increased Chinese control following the 2008 uprising. Tsering also pointed to demographic shifts in Tibet, noting that there are fewer children due to reduced family sizes.

Speaking to ANI, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Sikyong Penpa Tsering said, "Just like any other community, the Tibetan diaspora community is also facing a lot of social and demographic change. One reason is, of course, from 1959-60 people proceeded or followed His Holiness the Dalai Lama--about 80-85 thousand Tibetans who came to India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Then till about the early 80s, there was no movement from Tibet at all, and from the early 80s onwards, some Tibetans were coming out during Hua Guofeng's time, and then from the 90s and year 2000, there were quite many Tibetans coming out up to 2008. We used to receive any number between 2,500 to 3,500 Tibetans every year. Most of them were young children who were left behind to study in India, not knowing whether they would be able to meet their families again or not."

This drastic decline has resulted in the Tibetan Reception Centre in Khaniyara village near Dharamshala standing largely vacant.

[...]

"After the 2008 uprising in Tibet, there was more control inside Tibet, and there may be other reasons why those things are happening. After Xi Jinping came into power, the control over the whole of China, more particularly over the Tibetan people, has been very strong, and even small variables like tourist guides who have been bringing these people over the Himalayas by taking money--have also been removed from Lhasa, as a lot more pressure on the Nepalese government," said Tsering.

[...]

Tsering highlighted efforts in Western countries to create new compact communities. "The larger number of Tibetans are in North America, Europe, Australia--all these countries. So there have been some initiatives from some Tibetans, particularly in Manasota, where we are talking about at least 3,000 to 5,000 Tibetans. They are planning to acquire about 80 acres of land to accommodate about 300 families where the compact Tibetan communities [can thrive]. Another group is also planning to open a charter school for Tibetans. These are new ecosystems within the Tibetan community," he said.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18029055

Archived link

• Chinese commercial banks have flocked to buying government bonds as Beijing's stimulus push has failed to spur consumers loan demand.
• Total new yuan loans in the 11 months through to November 2024 fell over 20% to 17.1 trillion yuan ($2.33 trillion) from a year ago, according to data released by the People's Bank of China.
• Chinese sovereign bonds have seen a strong rally since December, with yields plunging to all-time lows this month.

With consumers and businesses gloomy about the prospects of the world's second-largest economy, loan growth has stalled. Beijing's stimulus push has so far not been able to spur consumer credit demand, and is yet to spark any meaningful rebound in the faltering economy.

So what do banks do with their cash? Buy government bonds.

Chinese sovereign bonds have seen a strong rally since December, with 10-year yields plunging to all-time lows this month, dropping by about 34 basis points, according to LSEG data.

"The lack of strong consumer and business loan demand has led the capital flows into the sovereign bonds market," said Edmund Goh, investment director of fixed income at abrdn in Singapore.

That said, "the biggest problem onshore is a lack of assets to invest," he added, as "there are no signs that China can get out of deflation at the moment."

[...]

"There is still a lack of quality borrowing demand as private enterprises remain cautious with approving new investments and households are also tightening purse strings," said Lynn Song, chief economist at ING.

[...]

The slowdown in loans comes as mortgages, which used to fuel credit demand, are still in the stage of bottoming, said Andy Maynard, managing director and head of equities at China Renaissance.

Chinese onshore investors have to contend with a lack of "investable asset to put money in, both in financial market and in physical market," he added.

[...]

Zong Ke [portfolio manager at Shanghai-based asset manager Wequant] said the current policy interventions are merely "efforts to prevent economic collapse and cushion against external shocks" and "simply to avoid a freefall."

[...]

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18029055

Archived link

• Chinese commercial banks have flocked to buying government bonds as Beijing's stimulus push has failed to spur consumers loan demand.
• Total new yuan loans in the 11 months through to November 2024 fell over 20% to 17.1 trillion yuan ($2.33 trillion) from a year ago, according to data released by the People's Bank of China.
• Chinese sovereign bonds have seen a strong rally since December, with yields plunging to all-time lows this month.

With consumers and businesses gloomy about the prospects of the world's second-largest economy, loan growth has stalled. Beijing's stimulus push has so far not been able to spur consumer credit demand, and is yet to spark any meaningful rebound in the faltering economy.

So what do banks do with their cash? Buy government bonds.

Chinese sovereign bonds have seen a strong rally since December, with 10-year yields plunging to all-time lows this month, dropping by about 34 basis points, according to LSEG data.

"The lack of strong consumer and business loan demand has led the capital flows into the sovereign bonds market," said Edmund Goh, investment director of fixed income at abrdn in Singapore.

That said, "the biggest problem onshore is a lack of assets to invest," he added, as "there are no signs that China can get out of deflation at the moment."

[...]

"There is still a lack of quality borrowing demand as private enterprises remain cautious with approving new investments and households are also tightening purse strings," said Lynn Song, chief economist at ING.

[...]

The slowdown in loans comes as mortgages, which used to fuel credit demand, are still in the stage of bottoming, said Andy Maynard, managing director and head of equities at China Renaissance.

Chinese onshore investors have to contend with a lack of "investable asset to put money in, both in financial market and in physical market," he added.

[...]

Zong Ke [portfolio manager at Shanghai-based asset manager Wequant] said the current policy interventions are merely "efforts to prevent economic collapse and cushion against external shocks" and "simply to avoid a freefall."

[...]

Archived link

• Chinese commercial banks have flocked to buying government bonds as Beijing's stimulus push has failed to spur consumers loan demand.
• Total new yuan loans in the 11 months through to November 2024 fell over 20% to 17.1 trillion yuan ($2.33 trillion) from a year ago, according to data released by the People's Bank of China.
• Chinese sovereign bonds have seen a strong rally since December, with yields plunging to all-time lows this month.

With consumers and businesses gloomy about the prospects of the world's second-largest economy, loan growth has stalled. Beijing's stimulus push has so far not been able to spur consumer credit demand, and is yet to spark any meaningful rebound in the faltering economy.

So what do banks do with their cash? Buy government bonds.

Chinese sovereign bonds have seen a strong rally since December, with 10-year yields plunging to all-time lows this month, dropping by about 34 basis points, according to LSEG data.

"The lack of strong consumer and business loan demand has led the capital flows into the sovereign bonds market," said Edmund Goh, investment director of fixed income at abrdn in Singapore.

That said, "the biggest problem onshore is a lack of assets to invest," he added, as "there are no signs that China can get out of deflation at the moment."

[...]

"There is still a lack of quality borrowing demand as private enterprises remain cautious with approving new investments and households are also tightening purse strings," said Lynn Song, chief economist at ING.

[...]

The slowdown in loans comes as mortgages, which used to fuel credit demand, are still in the stage of bottoming, said Andy Maynard, managing director and head of equities at China Renaissance.

Chinese onshore investors have to contend with a lack of "investable asset to put money in, both in financial market and in physical market," he added.

[...]

Zong Ke [portfolio manager at Shanghai-based asset manager Wequant] said the current policy interventions are merely "efforts to prevent economic collapse and cushion against external shocks" and "simply to avoid a freefall."

[...]

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18019990

Archived link

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now over a decade old. Since BRI’s inception in 2013, Beijing has pumped in $1 trillion in pledged investments. That includes $634 billion in construction contracts and $419 billion in non-financial investments, according to a 2023 report by the Green Finance & Development Center. The money, peppered across projects in as many as 140 countries, is ostensibly intended to build infrastructure that can boost a country’s trade with China.

The Dragon has worked hard to portray the initiative as one of modern history’s most ambitious connectivity projects. But portrayal and on-ground reality are different.

[...]

On the surface, BRI is a beacon of development for developing countries. Under this umbrella, Chinese loans finance large-scale infrastructure projects like ports, railways, highways, and energy facilities.

[...]

Under the surface, these loans are built on opaque agreements, high interest rates, and a lack of rigorous project feasibility assessments. The underlying strategy, critics argue, is clear: Extend credit to debt-distressed nations, knowing that repayment difficulties will compel concessions that favour Beijing’s strategic interests.

From control over critical infrastructure to enhanced geopolitical leverage, China’s gains often come at the expense of the borrower’s sovereignty.

This is the debt-trap diplomacy. And the pattern is everywhere—from Asia to Africa.

[...]

The debt-trap diplomacy thesis arose directly from Sri Lanka’s experience with the Hambantota Port. Sri Lanka’s former President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had dreamed of transforming a small fishing town into a major shipping hub. Rajapaksa secured loans worth over $1 billion from China’s Exim Bank between 2007 and 2012 to fulfil the dream. Then came trouble.

In 2017, unable to repay Chinese loans, Colombo was forced to lease the port to a Chinese company for 99 years.

The false promise of development led to a strategic asset in the country being leased to the regional bully for a century. This arrangement raised concerns about the erosion of economic sovereignty and the geopolitical implications of such dependency in the Indian Ocean region.

[...]

Pakistan, too, saw a similar result after choosing to rely on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI initiative.

With investments exceeding $60 billion, CPEC aimed to revolutionise Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy landscape. The power plants built using this funding generate enough electricity for Pakistan to use, and then some [...] However, under CPEC, Pakistan agreed to repay Chinese state companies not only the costs of building power plants but also guaranteed dollar-based returns of up to 34%, regardless of whether the electricity was consumed [...] The problem is not just of the energy infrastructure. The strategic Gwadar Port—once touted as a cornerstone of Pakistan’s economic revival—remains underutilised. It only serves as a symbol of Chinese influence, not a beacon of national development.

The trap works.

[...]

Across Africa too, the BRI has worked well (for China).

In Kenya, the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project—funded by Chinese loans—was envisioned as a catalyst for regional integration. Instead, it has become a cautionary tale. With limited freight demand and operational inefficiencies, the SGR has failed to justify its $4.7 billion price tag, leaving Nairobi grappling with a mounting debt burden.

Countries like Zambia and Djibouti now face debt levels that limit their fiscal flexibility and undermine domestic priorities.

[...]

The BRI is much more than a bundle of economic harm, though. It’s about access and power for China. From ports in Sri Lanka to railways in Kenya, Beijing’s control over critical infrastructure extends beyond economic transactions.

[...]

These assets can serve dual purposes, vastly advantageous for China’s aggressive military and strategic positioning, the likes of which have already been seen in the South China Sea (SCS) and the Indian Ocean. The cost of BRI participation is measured not only in dollars, but also in compromised autonomy.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18019990

Archived link

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now over a decade old. Since BRI’s inception in 2013, Beijing has pumped in $1 trillion in pledged investments. That includes $634 billion in construction contracts and $419 billion in non-financial investments, according to a 2023 report by the Green Finance & Development Center. The money, peppered across projects in as many as 140 countries, is ostensibly intended to build infrastructure that can boost a country’s trade with China.

The Dragon has worked hard to portray the initiative as one of modern history’s most ambitious connectivity projects. But portrayal and on-ground reality are different.

[...]

On the surface, BRI is a beacon of development for developing countries. Under this umbrella, Chinese loans finance large-scale infrastructure projects like ports, railways, highways, and energy facilities.

[...]

Under the surface, these loans are built on opaque agreements, high interest rates, and a lack of rigorous project feasibility assessments. The underlying strategy, critics argue, is clear: Extend credit to debt-distressed nations, knowing that repayment difficulties will compel concessions that favour Beijing’s strategic interests.

From control over critical infrastructure to enhanced geopolitical leverage, China’s gains often come at the expense of the borrower’s sovereignty.

This is the debt-trap diplomacy. And the pattern is everywhere—from Asia to Africa.

[...]

The debt-trap diplomacy thesis arose directly from Sri Lanka’s experience with the Hambantota Port. Sri Lanka’s former President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had dreamed of transforming a small fishing town into a major shipping hub. Rajapaksa secured loans worth over $1 billion from China’s Exim Bank between 2007 and 2012 to fulfil the dream. Then came trouble.

In 2017, unable to repay Chinese loans, Colombo was forced to lease the port to a Chinese company for 99 years.

The false promise of development led to a strategic asset in the country being leased to the regional bully for a century. This arrangement raised concerns about the erosion of economic sovereignty and the geopolitical implications of such dependency in the Indian Ocean region.

[...]

Pakistan, too, saw a similar result after choosing to rely on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI initiative.

With investments exceeding $60 billion, CPEC aimed to revolutionise Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy landscape. The power plants built using this funding generate enough electricity for Pakistan to use, and then some [...] However, under CPEC, Pakistan agreed to repay Chinese state companies not only the costs of building power plants but also guaranteed dollar-based returns of up to 34%, regardless of whether the electricity was consumed [...] The problem is not just of the energy infrastructure. The strategic Gwadar Port—once touted as a cornerstone of Pakistan’s economic revival—remains underutilised. It only serves as a symbol of Chinese influence, not a beacon of national development.

The trap works.

[...]

Across Africa too, the BRI has worked well (for China).

In Kenya, the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project—funded by Chinese loans—was envisioned as a catalyst for regional integration. Instead, it has become a cautionary tale. With limited freight demand and operational inefficiencies, the SGR has failed to justify its $4.7 billion price tag, leaving Nairobi grappling with a mounting debt burden.

Countries like Zambia and Djibouti now face debt levels that limit their fiscal flexibility and undermine domestic priorities.

[...]

The BRI is much more than a bundle of economic harm, though. It’s about access and power for China. From ports in Sri Lanka to railways in Kenya, Beijing’s control over critical infrastructure extends beyond economic transactions.

[...]

These assets can serve dual purposes, vastly advantageous for China’s aggressive military and strategic positioning, the likes of which have already been seen in the South China Sea (SCS) and the Indian Ocean. The cost of BRI participation is measured not only in dollars, but also in compromised autonomy.

[...]