M: [At] the big General Assembly there were three decisions made: that we focus on building an all-volunteer rapid response network; creating sanctuary schools that were protecting against ICE raids; and educating the neighborhood about their rights.

We did a lot of work around sanctuary schools but there actually was not as much that needed to be done because ICE was not actually going into schools at that point. But we were organizing in the main public school in K-Town.

We very quickly became super focused on just providing a rapid response network. That took up so much time and effort because doing that as a volunteer project requires a whole team of people doing logistics and doing trainings. Then a whole separate group of people has 24-hour dispatchers answering phone calls at any time of the day. And then a whole team of 200-plus first responders who are trained and ready to [act]. It is a lot of work, so we very quickly became consumed by keeping those structures running.

Our objective as a rapid response network was to block ICE raids. A lot of the nonprofit rapid response networks, their only purpose is for people to call, and they give callers resources on how they can maybe access legal representation or tell you your rights—which, you know, how much are those worth? Our goal was to actually intervene as much as possible, and we didn’t really succeed in that as much as we might have. It’s very hard to actually block ICE raids. I followed the news and reports of this very closely when we were organizing because I was trying to figure out how we could do it better. During the first Trump administration, it happened a couple of times around the whole of the US.

We did block an ICE truck once, but that was when we had a protest actually at the ICE building.

EC: I feel like we were actually able to figure out ICE’s plans a bit in the neighborhood. I remember we were constantly canvassing the Ralph’s parking lot because there were reports of a staging ground there. We reached out to local businesses and just had people almost patrolling there and had sent out first responders there several times. We were able to report when ICE started using unmarked vehicles in the neighborhood or when there were patterns and shifts in their behavior.

#Resolute Revolutionaries, Inclusive Structures Cultivate KPA

BRRN: In terms of organizing outcomes like campaign wins, organizer development, consistency of a project, KPA seems to have been one of, if not the most, successful experiments in popular assemblies during the first Trump administration. What contributed to it?

M: I agree that probably it was one of the most successful. That doesn’t mean that we actually had lots of big wins, though.

EC: Probably what contributed most to its success was a few very, very dedicated individuals, one of them being Morgan, but also some others that really went above and beyond and put in a ton of time and thought and heart into it.

M: There were a number of breakout groups aiming to become ‘popular assemblies’ from that first citywide General Assembly. KPA is the only one where there were basically revolutionaries who had a vision of neighborhood organizing and democracy who proposed “Let’s actually make this into an assembly.” Every single other ‘popular assembly’ from that initial citywide meeting died off very quickly. I think there were some similar efforts in other cities that died also either [because] they just didn’t take on a focus or they didn’t open themselves up as a neighborhood space and so they also didn’t really get on their feet. There may have been a couple of exceptions in, like, Portland.

EC: I think there was a lot of dedication to making [KPA] not just a typical organizing space [and] to making it as inclusive as possible, not just [for] academics or typical organizers but [for] everyday people.

There was the language justice component. By the time I was there, there was a designated interpreter with every meeting, notes were taken in both English and Spanish, and all statements were made in English and Spanish. But when did that get implemented?

M: I think from the beginning. From the beginning, all the notes are in English, but I see from who’s there [in the notes] that there are some people I remember being monolingual Spanish speakers. I also see that someone who was there was also a member of a group, Antena Los Ángeles, that provided movement interpretation services. I’m pretty sure the group was bilingual from the beginning, but I don’t remember exactly how we logistically did that in those very, very first meetings. The first General Assembly was trilingual, because it was in Korean as well, but we never had monolingual Korean speakers participate in the ongoing meetings.

EC: There was also an attempt to not just have meetings be centered around a nine-to-five schedule. They typically were, unfortunately, but there was at least a recognition that doesn’t necessarily coincide with the schedules of non-nine-to-five office workers. There would be some meetings and events that [were] at different times. I think just a lot of general statements of intention to that effect, right? I also think we could have done a better job, but the intent was there.

EC: The geography I think helps too: Koreatown’s not huge, so it just made it easier to meet and to keep the project rooted in the identity of the neighborhood.

M: [It’s] the only neighborhood in Los Angeles that actually feels like you’re in a city … Being a neighborhood group, we were able to do more social events than we would have if we were an LA-based group where we’re all two hours away from each other.

EC: I think there was a lot of trust, too, within most people of the organization. We had solid community guidelines and not just in a “let’s just do them” kind of way, but pretty strong commitment to them. I think it connects to the first thing, too, of valuing different perspectives and everyone’s experience is as valuable as the next person’s. By the time I got there, I think everyone had already built in relationships.

M: One part is that making a local practical group or project means it’s going to be less focused on some of the various left groups and activist personalities.

We didn’t really have to deal with a lot of that [in KPA]. We didn’t have to deal with people who were coming to try and stroke their own ego or get credit for something.

I also think that doing a lot of work together where you could see that [you were] having an impact and you knew what you were doing and what your purpose was also kept people focused and grounded. Being more of a neighborhood-based group kept things grounded [by] having a lot of existing connections prior to KPA, whether it’s members’ former high school students or co-workers. A lot of people worked together and knew each other from different workplaces or groups.

#COVID Complications, Biden In Office Stall KPA BRRN: KPA slowly wound down its activity before formally closing in 2022. Can you share what led to its slow decline and eventual end?

EC: I think it was core members leaving, and not because of not liking the work, but [because of] life: people moving, people getting promoted, getting married, having kids. I went to law school [outside of LA], Morgan through his work had to move [out of LA], too, and there were other members who had to leave for various reasons.

M: We were [meeting] online [because] the pandemic scattered a number of us. At that point a number of us were out of LA. COVID meant we were meeting on Zoom and it was so much harder to bring people in and recruit people.

EC: At another level, all of these things ultimately led to its demise because of underlying issues around recruitment and retention. You had to have a lot of knowledge around how the group worked in order to not be bored at meetings or to not feel intimidated. And as much as I think we tried to have intros each time about the background and stuff, sometimes those meetings could get long, and so people skip them sometimes and forget to explain some things. It’s a small group, we were doing a lot, and there was not someone who’s actively always doing mass recruitment; it was just people connecting with people they already knew.

Even if there were recruitment efforts, to follow up with people to get them to really join was hard. On top of the meetings, there was actual first response stuff, too: taking shifts as dispatchers, planning the trainings, and responding to calls. Also, a lot of stuff started coming through Instagram instead of the call line. So, I think, in general, it was too much work for too few people and I think that leads to burnout. It also just makes it harder for new people to join because it seems so intimidating.

M: We consistently got recruitment and activity when there were things in the news around immigration-related stuff. During the Trump administration, there consistently would be like, oh, DACA is going to be repealed, for example, and children being separated at the border. We consistently [would] get pulses of activity. More people would come to our events or trainings and through the trainings, people would get involved with the planning committee, we build capacity, etc.

Under Biden, that stopped happening. It was much harder to recruit people after Biden was elected [even though] Biden was deporting just as many people as Trump did in his first term. But it wasn’t nearly as flashy in a way. It was much more of a bureaucratic process. So, there wasn’t the same attention on the issue.