this post was submitted on 03 Sep 2022
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submitted 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) by jonesv@lemmy.ml to c/security@lemmy.ml
 

Users of the Signal messaging app got hit by a hacker attack. We analyze what happened and why the attack demonstrates that Signal is reliable.

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[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) (1 children)

One may have all the encryption you want, but if the 2FA SMS whispers entry to the hackers, it's clear that they're not coming in through the security door but through the broken window...

[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 5 points 2 years ago (1 children)

To be fair, even though they bypassed the 2FA, they did not get access to previous conversations and contact list. That's the point of the article, right?

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 5 points 2 years ago (1 children)

Even if the encryption does not collapse, it is still an app full of identifiers. That makes metadata available. An attacker could figure out who contacted whom.

[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 6 points 2 years ago (3 children)

Whenever someone says "Signal is not good enough", my answer is "what's your threat model"? For me it's a pretty damn good compromise given that all my friends and family are on it (as opposed to e.g. using WhatsApp or Telegram 99% of the time and a perfect alternative with one contact). The day I can realistically think about making my contacts move to a better alternative, I'll do it. In the meantime, that's the best I've got. And it's not too bad, to be fair.

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago)

Uh, I forgot to tell you that the "account" is safely saved locally (something) like jones.zip. That's it!

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago (2 children)

In the meantime, that’s the best I’ve got. And it’s not too bad, to be fair.

Are you quite certain? Have you looked hard and concluded that Signal is the best alternative available today?

I can tell you that my messenger doesn't use identifiers, it doesn't track me, it doesn't care who my contacts are, it doesn't ask for my email, phone number, and importantly it does everything Signal does.

[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 4 points 2 years ago (1 children)

Yes, I have been following Signal and alternatives since... well since TextSecure was only for SMS. And I find that many times people critical about Signal don't really know much about it except for the fact that it uses the phone number (not the email).

Again, not saying it's perfect. Just that for my threat model (which arguably is a valid threat model for billions of people), it's a very good solution.

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago (1 children)

You cannot know what kind of government we will have in ten years, nor is it said that your good behavior will be enough to keep you out of trouble. Millions of Jews had done nothing wrong, yet they were persecuted. Moreover, the fact that you have nothing to hide does not fully express what you could do if you had instead: sort of like giving up your right to speak because you have nothing to say.

[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 4 points 2 years ago (1 children)

This seems completely off-topic to me. I never said I have nothing to hide. The Signal client app (i.e. the part that you can audit, compile and run, not the server) provides a lot of privacy already: e2e encryption via the excellent Signal protocol, private profile, private groups, sealed sender. So in terms of metadata, the Signal server never knows what you write, who is in which group, and to whom you are writing. Again, from the client code that you can audit yourself before you run it.

On top of that, leveraging the secure enclaves, the Signal server (tries to) guarantee(s) the private contact discovery (based on the hashes of your contact list). Which means that if you trust the SGX enclave, all that the Signal server knows is your phone number. If you don't trust the enclave, then you can assume that the server got access to your contacts when you did the discovery (i.e. when you installed the app).

That's very, very, very far from saying I have nothing to hide.

[–] linzilla@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago (3 children)

Signal introduced closed-source server side code last November. The founder and CEO stepped down from his position this January... End of story to me about Signal

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago)

Oh yeah bro. You have my thumbnail up. Seems only a detail but freedom defenders (Signal) have their backs sitted in California...

[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago

Signal introduced closed-source server side code last November.

What? I'm not aware of that. Source?

[–] altair222 1 points 2 years ago

Source for this claim?

[–] nachtigall@feddit.de 1 points 2 years ago (1 children)
[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago (1 children)

It is the sole messenger that doesn't use identificators. You cannot get wrong.

[–] altair222 2 points 2 years ago (1 children)

No identificators at all? Lol sure, who else is using it with you?

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 1 points 2 years ago (1 children)

At the moment I think more than 3000 people. Young app. Needs it to spread.

[–] nachtigall@feddit.de 4 points 2 years ago (1 children)

If it needs to spread, don't make a secret of it lol. Briar, SimpleX, something else?

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 3 points 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) (1 children)
[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 3 points 2 years ago (1 children)

Oh, yet another messenger that pretends that it's the only one that can prevent MITM. Abusive marketing, or plain misunderstanding of what e2ee means? Anyway I wouldn't trust them just for that.

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago (1 children)

The code is open. You can check your own doubts.

[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 3 points 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) (1 children)

Not my point. Their webpage says that others (Signal included) are not protected against MITM (in the case of Signal, there is a note saying "if the server is compromised"). Which is plain wrong.

[–] bkrl@lemmy.ml 2 points 2 years ago (1 children)

Are you aware that, just to start somewhere, Signal asks (and needs) your phone number to make the service work? If you write "go to hell" to a person and two minutes later you regret it that person can accuse you with absolutely legal evidence in his or her favor. Is everything normal?

[–] jonesv@lemmy.ml 5 points 2 years ago

First, that's completely unrelated to the very concept of MITM. Second, it also shows that you have no clue about how such protocols work (in Signal, in SimpleX, or anywhere else). I really don't understand why people who are really into secure messengers often don't really care about how they actually work... I mean it is damn interesting!

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